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In sum, social neuroscience is an interdisciplinary
field that is helping to illuminate questions ranging
from the social sciences to the neurosciences by
examining how organismic processes are shaped,
modulated, and modified by social factors and vice
versa.
See also: Behavioral Neuroscience; Comparative
Neuroscience; Psychophysiology
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Social Properties (Facts and Entities):
Philosophical Aspects
One area of philosophical concern, dating from the
very beginning of philosophy itself, is ontology: what
is there?; or, what kinds of things are there? Many
questions about existence are straightforwardly em-
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pirical, and hence of no interest to the ontologist. Are
there unicorns, wombats, planets circling stars other
than our Sun? But other existence questions are not
empirical, and these are the province of the ontologist.
Are there any physical objects, ideas, forms, numbers,
sets, propositions, minds, concepts, a Deity, social
wholes? To answer these questions is to engage in
producing a list of the metaphysical kinds of things
that one believes exist.
‘Existence’ in what sense? Some philosophers have
held that each metaphysically different kind of thing
exists in its own, special sense of ‘existence’; or they
may distinguish between being, existence, subsistence,
and so on.
A more plausible view is that ‘existence’ is univocal,
that whatever exists exists in the same sense, and that
differences in the ‘mode’ of existence, say, of mind and
body, arise not because existence differs in the two
cases but because of the differences between minds
and bodies themselves. Bodies have a spatial ‘mode’ of
existence, it might be thought, and minds do not, but,
if so, that is because of the differences between them,
not because they exist in different senses of that word.
Besides, if existence had a special sense for each
metaphysical kind of thing, ontology could become
somewhat trivial. To the question of whether, say,
propositions really exist, it would be anodyne simply
to say that they do exist, but only in the special
proposition-sense of existence. Or that minds exist,
but only in the special mental sense of existence. Or
that possibilia subsist rather than exist (since that is
what possible things do) whereas actual things exist
rather than subsist. Ontology would entail no honest
labor, and therefore no real rewards.
1. Ontological Commitments and How to
Wriggle Out of Them
When we speak, indeed even whenever we simply
think, we typically take ourselves to be speaking or
thinking about various things. It is not easy to capture
this notion of aboutness, but here I rely on the readers’
intuitive grasp of the idea.
I do not always think or speak about anything,
whenever I speak or think: in (a) ‘whoever is a bachelor
is neurotic,’ I am not trying to speak or think about
any particular thing, or even about any set of things. In
(a), I ammerely linking up twoproperties: the property
of being a bachelor and the property of being neurotic,
but I am not speaking about those properties. If I want
to speak about the set of bachelors and the set of
neurotic persons, I could say: (b) ‘The set of bachelors
is a proper subset of the set of neurotic persons.’ (b) is
certainly not equivalent to (a), since (b) has ontological
commitments of which (a) is wholly innocent.
I might be thinking or speaking about Socrates or
the man I met yesterday or the tallest building in New
York. Let us call whatever I think or speak about
‘entities.’ There are a number of ways in which things
can go wrong when I speak about entities. First, I can
make mistakes, e.g., when I take myself to be thinking
about something that does not in fact exist: Atlantis,
Vulcan, witches, or phlogiston. These are cases in
which we really are intending to think about some-
thing, but fail. Let us call these sorts of cases, ‘cases of
elimination.’ There simply are no such things, and if
we have at first placed them on our list of what there is,
on finding that they do not exist, we remove or
eliminate them from the list. Some philosophers have
said this about minds, or mental states. In cases of
elimination, nothing can be salvaged from talk about
such things as it stands. Such talk is plain false (see
Lycan and Pappas 1972).
Second, there are cases which, on first appearance,
seem to be ones in which I am speaking or thinking
about something, but closer inspection dispels the
appearance.Not all cases of apparently thinking about
something turn out, on analysis, really to be such. I
may not be really intending to talk about the thing in
question at all. I may, for example, talk about the
average family, but such talk or thought is not really
about what it might seem to be about. There is no such
thing as the average family about which I am talking.
Average-family talk or thought is merely shorthand
for talking about the number of people in the country
divided by the number of households (or something
like this anyway). There is no such thing as the average
family, nothing that should be taken ontologically
seriously, beyond taking seriously households and
people.
Let us call these cases, ‘cases of replacement.’ The
original talk, r

(‘the average family’) has apparent
ontological commitments of some sort. The replacing
talk, r

(‘households’ and ‘persons’) does not have
those same apparent ontological commitments
(although of course it has some of its own). The
burden of proof, in such cases, falls on the person
wishing to show that some of the ontological commit-
ments of the original talk are apparent but not real. He
or she must indicate the replacing talk that lacks them.
In these cases, our original talk gets salvaged, because
it is true, if the replacing sentence without the same
apparent ontological commitments is true.
What must be the case for the replacing talk, r

, to
count as an adequate replacement for the original talk,
r





, must convey the same
information, and part of that requirement is that r

if
and only if r

. No two sentences can convey the same
information unless they at least have the same truth
values. Beyond this, matters get controversial, but the
same-truth-value condition will suffice for our
purposes.
It is not required that the replacement can actually




might be cumbersome, complicated, long-winded, or
whatever. The replacement must be theoretically
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possible, and the supporter of the replacement needs
to show how the replacement is possible in principle,
but not necessarily in practice.
Third, and closely related to the above, are cases in
which our talk or thought really and not just ap-
parently is about some entities, but they turn out not to
be sui generis, since they can be reductively identified
as or with another thing. These are, appropriately,
cases of reductive identification.
This is the reductive identification which claims so
much of philosophers’ energies. There are, it may be
said, physical objects, but they are really only sets of
sense data; there are mental states, but they are
identical with brain states; there are numbers but they
are merely the same as sets of sets. Such attempts at
reductive identification allow the philosophical cake
to be both had and eaten. Along with common sense,
it can be asserted that there are such things. But, along
with some ideal of philosophical acceptability, they
can be shown to be reductively identified as merely
another thing after all.
Insofar as philosophical reductive identification
succeeds, it allows us to shorten our ontological list,
while not denying the claims of common sense. It is for
this reason that the term ‘reductive’ is appropriate;
these identifications permit a reduction in the number
of basic ontological commitments. On a materialist
reductive analysis, for example, there are minds, but
they do not have to be taken ontologically seriously,
beyond taking bodily or brain states or whatever
seriously. Or, according to Berkeleyian idealism, there
are tables, chairs, and so on, but they are only ideas in
themind. Once ideas in the mind are on the ontological
list, adding tables and chairs would be superfluous.
Tables and chairs are already on the list, if ideas in the
mind are.
Again, in cases of reductive identification, our talk
gets salvaged, since the original talk is true if the
analysis containing the reductive identifier is (see
Reduction, Varieties of).
2. Entities, Properties, Facts
Socrates or the man I met yesterday or the tallest
building in New York are concrete objects. Sets and
numbers and propositions, if there are such, are
abstract objects, which are neither spatial nor tem-
poral. Other things we think or speak about include
spatio-temporal nonconcreta: events and actions, such
as the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and the first
running of a mile under 4 min; processes such as the
erosion of the soil in some specific place over a specific
period; and states such as the lake’s remaining calm on
such-and-such a night or the stillness of the air on a
summer’s eve or the presence of helium in a balloon.
Thinking or talking about any sort of thing is
caught by reference; we refer to something, namely, to
that entity our thought or language is about.This entry
confines itself to discussion of facts, entities, and
properties, as such referents of our thought, but no
discussion of social ontology could be complete unless
it brought to the fore actions, and in particular social
actions (see Joint Action and Action, Collectie).
Typically, when I think about something, I also
ascribe some feature or characteristic to it. For
example, when I say of Socrates that he is snub-nosed,
or of the man I met yesterday that he is a spy, or of the
erosion of the soil that it was accidental, I ascribe such
a feature or characteristic. Let us call these features or
characteristics ‘properties.’ The duality of reference
and ascription is captured grammatically by the
distinction between subject and predicate, and meta-
physically by the distinction between entity and
property. (All of this needs serious qualification, and
extension to other sorts of sentences, but I forego that
pleasure here.)
Are there, ontologically speaking, properties as well
as entities? There are at least two ways in which to
handle this question. First, there is the austere point of
view that says that ascribing properties is not enough
to be ontologically committed to them. There are
properties, only if we talk or think about them, refer to
them, and if such talk or thought cannot be eliminated
or replaced by other talk or thought which makes no
such ontological commitment (see Quine 1963).
There are, though, cases in which we do appear to
refer to properties: (a) ‘The color crimson is a shade of
the color red.’ It is easy to show that (b) ‘The set of
crimson things is a subset of the set of red things’ will
not do as a replacement for (a). And if no such
replacement or elimination is possible, then there are
properties, although they may not be sui generis, if any
reductive identification of them is possible.
Second, there is the more relaxed approach, which
says that we are ontologically committed to properties
if they are actually instantiated (or perhaps even if
only well defined), whether or not we refer to them or
talk about them. Ascription alone, without reference,
may still involve us in ontological commitment. If so,
‘this visual patch is red,’ which ascribes the property
of being red to something, but does not refer to the
property, commits us to the property of being red as
well as to a visual patch, since the sentence insures that
redness has at least one actual instance.
Finally, and much more controversially, some
philosophers have believed that our account of what
there is must include not only entities and properties,
but also facts, for example the fact that some entity e
has some property P. Facts have been enlisted for
many purposes, one such being a correspondence
theory of truth, and another being causal analysis. Are
sentences true when they correspond to the facts? Is it
the fact that the match was struck that caused it to
light? These two particular uses of facts have come in
for some devastating criticism. But even so, there may
well be facts, even if they are useless in theories of truth
and for analyses of causality.
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If it is a fact that Socrates is snub-nosed, then is not
there at least that fact? At least on first appearance, it
seems that there are facts. If so, there are not only
Socrates and the property of being snub-nosed, but
also Socrates’ being snub-nosed (a state) and the fact
that he is snub-nosed. If there are facts, then they
count as a kind of entity, if they can be referred to and
occupy subject position in sentences. ‘The fact that
Fiorello LaGuardia was elected disturbed many of his
opponents,’ was no doubt true, so we do seem to refer
to facts. Without mere replacement, or elimination, or
reductive identification, we have facts on our onto-
logical list, as well as entities and properties, states,
and events.
Needless to say, philosophers have disputedwhether
all of these ‘reifications’ are really required, and
whether some can be understood in terms of the
others. Perhaps numbers are just sets. Perhaps propo-
sitions are just sets of similar sentences. Perhaps minds
are just brains. Perhaps there is the fact that Socrates
is snub-nosed, or perhaps there is no such thing. And
even if there is this fact, maybe it is identical with the
state, Socrates’ being snub-nosed. But none of that
need be decided here.
3. Some Social Ontology
Thought and discourse about society, whether lay or
by the social scientist, raises these ontological
questions too. Just as I can think about Socrates or the
tallest building in New York, so too I can think about
France or the Icelandic working class or the com-
modity market or the National Football League. Our
very thought about society appears to commit us to
believing in nation states, governments, classes, social
structures, tribes, clubs, associations, and so on, just as
our thought about Socrates and the tallest building in
New York appears to commit us to believing in
persons and buildings. And we are really committed to
these social entities, unless we can show that these turn
out to be cases in which either we can, without loss,
eliminate discourse about social entities entirely, or we
can replace such talk with other talk that makes no
similar ontological commitment, or there is some
reductive identification available for the putative
social entities.
What does ‘social’ connote? The basic application
of the term relates to properties (for more about social
properties, see below). What makes a property a social
property? This is, I think, a difficult question. Some
entity’s having a property may have a social cause or
social effect, without making the property itself social.
For example, the soil’s being eroded may be caused by
inept bureaucracy, and may result in a stock market
plunge, but none of that makes the property of being
eroded a social property. Whether a property is social
depends on something intrinsic about the property
itself, and not on the causes or effects of its being
instantiated.
A property is social (roughly, without some refine-
ments unnecessary here) if and only if from the fact
that it is instantiated, it follows that at least two people
exist and have an interlocking system of beliefs and
expectations about one another’s thoughts or actions.
Intuitively, I think this gets our idea of sociality about
right, although one might just think that the requisite
number should be greater than two. For example, the
property of jointly carrying something is not social on
this account, and rightly so, because two men might
jointly carry something without either being aware of
what the other was doing, oblivious to each other’s
very existence. Jointly carrying requires two people,
but makes no demands on their beliefs and expect-
ations about one another. Purchasing a stone is, on
the other hand, a social property on this account, and
rightly so. No two people could be engaged in such a
transaction without having a whole host of beliefs and
expectations about the actions of the other.
Social entities, if such there be, are entities such that
they have at least one social property essentially.
France, for example, is essentially a nation; the
Icelandic working class is essentially a class, a working
class, and Icelandic. Once the idea of a social property
is to hand, we can use it to introduce the idea of
sociality as applied to other ontological categories. So
our idea of the social fans outwards, as it were, from
our idea of a social property.
Social entities, if such there be, are never concrete, in
the way in which earlier examples of entities were.
Concrete entities, like Socrates and the tallest building
in New York, are exclusive space occupiers, no two of
which can occupy the same space at the same time.
Social entities do, in general, appear to be space
occupiers; France occupies a certain region of physical
space, the Icelandic working class is physically in
Iceland. But social entities are not exclusive space
occupiers. Suppose a diocese of the Catholic Church,
call it ‘Sancta Gallia,’ occupies exactly the same
geographical area as does France. If so, two distinct
social entities, France and Sancta Gallia, occupy the
same physical space at the same time.
What, then, of the three options we have available,
for dealing with these apparent ontological commit-
ments of our social discourse? Elimination of dis-
course about social entities would seem to involve an
intellectual loss; we could not even in principle say
things we would want to say without the discourse.
(Imagine where we would be without sociology,
anthropology, and a part of economics, for example.)
The issue here is not just one of linguistic economy. It
is not that we could not nearly as easily say what we
want without social discourse but could only do so in
an altogether more baroque fashion; rather, the claim
is that we would have no way in principle of conveying
what we want to say without that social discourse.
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On the other hand, replacement does seem possible
for some very simple examples. A case which has been
mentioned in the literature is ‘The Jewish race is
cohesive,’ which appears to commit the speaker or
thinker to an entity, the Jewish race. But, it is alleged,
this is replaceable by ‘Jews tend to marry other Jews,’
etc., and the latter makes no such ontological com-
mitment to the existence of a race. ‘The Jewish race is
cohesive’ behaves very much like ‘The average family
has 3.2 members.’ (See J. W. N. Watkins, ‘Ideal Types
and Historical Explanation’ and ‘Historical Expla-
nation in the Social Sciences,’ the first of which is
reprinted in Ryan (1973), and both of which are
reprinted in O’Neill (1973).)
I do not wish to claim that these replacements are
never available; perhaps they do work for the case just
mentioned. But it seems hard to see what replacement
strategy would work for many other examples. Con-
sider ‘France is a charter member of the United
Nations.’ What sentence or sentences could replace
this, yet convey the same information, at least in the
sense of having the same truth value, and yet make no
ontic commitments to a nation state and a world
organization? I can here only invite the reader to
suggest candidates; I myself know of none. Replace-
ment does not work as a general strategy.
However, it is one thing to admit that there are such
entities as France, the United Nations, and the
Icelandic working class, but quite another to insist
that they cannot be reductively identified with some-
thing more respectable. Many philosophers are drawn
to reductive strategies of one kind or another: there are
mental states, but they are (merely) identical with
brain states; there are numbers, but they are (merely)
identical with sets of sets; there are physical objects,
but they are (merely) identical with sets of sense data.
So too various reductive strategies suggest them-
selves for social entities: France is (merely) a geo-
graphical area, a set of persons, etc. No one can
‘prove’ that no reductive strategy could work. What
must be done, I think, is to evaluate each reductive
strategy that suggests itself, one-by-one.
There are some general lessons one can draw,
though. The vague thought, ‘Nations are identical
with the people who make them up,’ is ill-formed. In
any reductive identification, names must flank both
sides of the identity sign. So, for instance, ‘France 
.’ Well, identical with what? Name fillers for the
space on the right-hand side of the identity sign will
either be extensional or nonextensional entities, in the
following sense. Sets and aggregates and land masses
are extensional, since, if and only if a and b are sets or
aggregates or land masses, a  b if and only if a and
b have exactly the same members, or components, or
parts.
But no extensional entity in this sense could be
identical with France, for example, since their identity
conditions will differ. France can remain numerically
one and the same, in spite of variation in its citizenry
or residents, or land occupancy. Even if one considered
the set of all actual citizens of France or pieces of land
that France ever occupied at any time, past, present,
and future, there would be counterfactual differences.
France could have occupied a different piece of land
than it did, or had different citizens or residents than
it did, but this could not be true of the set or aggregate
of its citizens, residents, or lands. France is non-
extensional; sets, aggregates, and land masses are
extensional, and no nonextensional entity could be
identical with an extensional one. (In fact, this little
argument which relies on counterfactual differences
assumes that ‘France’ and ‘the set of .’ both rigidly
designate, since the identity required is identity across
all possible worlds. But I would argue that this
assumption is true.)
If France is a nonextensional entity and no non-
extensional entity can be identical with an extensional
one, then what about some nonextensional entity for
the reductive identification of France? Examples that
come to mind are things like groups. Is France to be
identified with the group of French people? The
problem with this suggestion is that a group seems
itself to be a social entity, and hence hardly a candidate
for the reductive identification of France with a
nonsocial entity. What the determined reductivist
needs to find is a nonextensional entity which is also
nonsocial, for the reductive identification of France,
and I am aware of no such obvious candidate.
So much for social entities. What sort of properties
get ascribed to things when we think or talk socially?
We can think or speak of either social entities or
nonsocial ones like Socrates or the tallest building in
New York and, in either case, ascribe social properties
to them: ‘France is a charter member of the United
Nations’ ascribes to a pair of social entities, France
and the United Nations, the relational social property
of being a charter member of; ‘Socrates was mayor of
Athens’ ascribes (falsely, as it happens) to a nonsocial
entity, Socrates, the relational social property of being
a mayor of.
From the fact that social properties figure in our
discourse, it does not yet follow that we refer to or
think about social properties. The relational social
property, being the mayor of, certainly figures in
‘Fiorello LaGuardia was mayor of New York,’ but
the sentence is not about that social property. It is only
about Fiorello LaGuardia and New York.
On the relaxed criterion, the sentence commits us to
the existence of three things: a person, a city, and the
social property of being a mayor of. On the austere
criterion, since the sentence is only about Fiorello
LaGuardia and New York, the sentence commits us
only to the existence of a person and a city, but not to
the existence of a social property.
But even were we to adopt the austere view, there
are a host of arguments, modeled on ones about
properties generally, which do move us to talking
about social properties, and so to the existence of
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social properties. Here are terse statements of two such
arguments: (a) If Iceland is capitalist, and if France is
capitalist, then there is some property that Iceland and
France share; (b) If France is a charter member of the
United Nations, then it follows that France is a
member of the United Nations. The inference in (b)
requires taking properties ontologically seriously.The
first argument parallels one by Hilary Putnam (1980)
on properties generally; the second parallels one by
Donald Davidson (1980) on action.
So we talk and think about social properties, and I
do not see how we could simply eliminate, do without,
such discourse. Nor do I know of any discourse which
could replace discourse about social properties, and
which both lacked the ontological commitment to
social properties but allowed us to convey the same
information or messages. So, on the austere view,
there seem to be social properties, as well as nonsocial
ones. A fortiori, on the relaxed view, we get properties,
social and nonsocial, just insofar as we ascribe them to
actually existent things, or just in case they are well
defined.
Could each social property be reductively identified
either with some specific nonsocial property, or with
some finite Boolean construction of such? I doubt
whether this could be so. Let me give an indication of
why I think this. Some social properties are both
nonvariable and weak, in the following senses. A
social property P is nonvariable if and only if P is
instantiated, then some specific set s of interlocking
beliefs and expectations exists. For example, the
property of participating in the custom of drinking tea
at breakfast is nonvariable, since the beliefs and
expectations associated with it must be the set of
beliefs and expectations about drinking tea at break-
fast. A social property P is weak if and only if P is
instantiated, then the interlocking beliefs and expec-
tations are about types of events which are not
themselves social. The social property of participating
in the custom of drinking tea at breakfast is also weak,
since the beliefs and expectations associated with it
concern drinking tea at breakfast, which is itself a
nonsocial event or activity.
But the most characteristic sorts of social property
are neither nonvariable nor weak; they are variable
and strong. Consider the property of being a mayor. If
that property is instantiated, it is true that some set of
interlocking beliefs and expectations must exist, but
there is no one particular set that must exist. There is
an indefinitely wide range of things that a mayor might
be expected to do in various different societies or social
settings. So the property is variable, in the sense of
being indefinitely variably instantiable. Moreover the
property is strong, since what a mayor is expected to
do involves events and activities like receiving the
ceremonial key to the city, opening formal events,
representing the city at certain social or political
functions, and so on, and these things are themselves
social events or activities.
It seems to me that these two features of typically
social properties make the reductive identification of
social properties with nonsocial ones exceedingly
implausible. One might have thought that a social
property could be reductively identified with the nested
and interlocking set of beliefs and expectations with
which it is associated. But since there is an indefinitely
long list of such sets associated with each typically
social property, and these beliefs and expectations
themselves require the existence of social events or
activities, the reductive identification appears to fail.
I do not have the space here to discuss the issue at
length of whether it is necessary to admit facts to our
ontology. Frequently, the case for or against reduction
of social science to physical science has been put in
terms of facts; supervenience claims in social science
typically enlist social and nonsocial facts as the terms
of the debate. (See Maurice Mandelbaum, ‘Societal
facts,’ reprinted in Ryan (1973) and O’Neill (1973).)
But what does seem plain is that if there are facts,
then, in the light of what we have already said above
about social properties and social entities, there must
be social facts. A fact would qualify as social if either
it was a fact about a social entity, or it was a fact about
any kind of entity, social or nonsocial, and attributed
a social property to that entity. So the fact that the
United Nations contributed to relief in Kosovo is a
social fact, since it is about a social entity, and the fact
that LaGuardia was mayor of New York is a social
fact, since it attributes a social property to a nonsocial
entity, namely to a person.
Often, the positions described in the relevant litera-
ture about social ontology are posed in terms of
individualism and holism, sometimes with the quali-
fying adjective, ‘methodological’ added (see Meth-
odological Indiidualism: Philosophical Aspects).
Sometimes, the positions are expressed in terms of
facts, and at other times, in terms of entities. Supe-
rvenience claims for the social (‘the social supervenes
on the nonsocial’) are sometimes posed in terms of
facts, at other times in terms of properties. It might be
claimed that there are no irreducible social facts, or
that there are no irreducible social entities or that there
are no irreducible social properties. As can be seen
from the discussion above, the positions are not
equivalent. For example, as I have claimed, some
social facts ascribe social properties to nonsocial
entities.
Rarely, if at all, is the distinction drawn between the
existence of entities, properties, and facts. Does
individualism in the social sciences eschew social
entities but admit irreducible social properties? Or
should it eschew both? What should it say about facts?
Might there be distinct versions of individualism, so
that it comes in stronger and weaker forms?
The lesson is that these terms, ‘holism’ and
‘individualism,’ do not name unambiguous positions
unless and until various distinctions are drawn, and
the ontological claims of each position are clearly
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specified. (See S. Lukes, ‘Methodological Individu-
alism Reconsidered,’ reprinted in Ryan (1973).)
See also: Atomism and Holism: Philosophical Aspects;
Causation: Physical, Mental, and Social; Causes and
Laws: Philosophical Aspects; Identity and Identif-
ication: Philosophical Aspects; Individualism versus
Collectivism: Philosophical Aspects; Shared Belief
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Social Protests, History of
Social protests have been integral to collective life
since the first complex communities were formed. One
of the oldest references to protest was found on an
inscription in a tomb in Egypt’s Valley of the Kings
from the reign (1198–66 BC) of Rameses III in the
New Kingdom translated as follows: ‘Today the gang
of workmen have passed by the walls of the royal tomb
saying: we are hungry, eighteen days have gone by,
and they sat down behind the funerary temple of
Tuthmosis III … the workmen remained in the same
place all day’ (Romer 1982, pp. 193–5).
Social protest is defined here as contentious action
undertaken collectively in response to perceived in-
justice or unfair action on the part of those who hold
legitimate political and economic power. It seeks to
achieve social (as opposed to political and economic)
ends, or alternatively to restore or return to earlier
ways of life. Examples of such aims are a more
equitable distribution of privilege or wealth, reducing
inequality among persons or groups, changing or
restoring religious beliefs andor cultural practices,
and reversing cultural change. This article examines
social protest in Western and non-Western societies
starting in Antiquity and through the nineteenth
century.
1. Protest in Imperial Rome
The authoritarian regime of Imperial Rome did not
offer many opportunities for peaceful communication
of ordinary people’s grievances or wishes; despite the
city’s heavy policing, however, the large agglo-
merations of people in the Colosseum, Circus, and
theaters offered the possibility of mass (and more or
less anonymous) expressions of popular opinion. In
these settings, crowds could shout demands in the
Emperor’s presence for the disciplining of a hated
official, or object to an unpopular war. The streets too
were a locus for popular protest, especially that about
the shortage or high price of grain. Street disorder of
this type contributed to the fall of Nero. Crowds of
ordinary citizens might also call for the downfall of a
usurper of the Imperial throne or express their
dissatisfaction with a prefect or his policy.
The grain riot or angry complaints about the high
price of bread continued to be a feature of popular
protest in many parts of the world, right into the
twentieth century. Most medieval and early modern
European states sought to regulate the grain trade and
concomitantly the price of bread at retail. These
controls began to be modified and eventually removed
as trade was liberalized in Western Europe, and newly
formulated laissez-faire theories were put into effect in
the late seventeenth century. The result was an upsurge
of two types of protest: (a) crowd blockage of grain
being moved on roads or waterways out of a growing
region with a surplus to one with a shortage, or a city
(especially an administrative city or the capital) with a
stronger claim on adequate supplies; and (b) the
market riot with confiscation of grain, its sale by the
14397
Social Protests, History of
Copyright  2001 Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights reserved.
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences ISBN: 0-08-043076-7
